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Resilience and Water Governance: Adaptive Governance in the Columbia
River Basin
Barbara A. Cosens 1,2 and Mark Kevin Williams 3
ABSTRACT. The 1964 Columbia River Treaty between the United States and Canada is currently under review. Under the
treaty, the river is jointly operated by the two countries for hydropower and is the largest producer of hydropower in the western
hemisphere. In considering the next phase of international river governance, the degree of uncertainty surrounding the drivers
of change complicates efforts to predict and manage under traditional approaches that rely on historical ecosystem responses.
At the same time, changes in social values have focused attention on ecosystem health, the decline of which has led to the listing
of seven salmon and four steelhead populations under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Although adaptive management is
considered one approach to resource management in the face of uncertainty, an early attempt at its implementation in the U.S.
portion of the basin failed. We explore these issues in the context of resilience, taking the position that while adaptive management
may foster ecological resilience, it is only one factor in the institutional changes needed to foster social-ecological resilience
captured in the concept of adaptive governance.
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INTRODUCTION
Political boundaries are drawn without consideration of river
basin boundaries, as evidenced by the existence of 276 surface
water resources that cross international boundaries (Oregon
State University, Program in Water Conflict Management and
Transformation, Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database,
URL: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/)
and many more that cross sub-national jurisdictional
boundaries. Over the next decade, several contributing factors
could trigger rapid change in these international watersheds,
placing greater demands on competing water interests and
increasing the need for cooperation across jurisdictional
boundaries. These contributing factors include: climate
change, continued population growth, a threatened and
deteriorating ecosystem, demand for non-fossil fuel energy,
and aging infrastructure. Uncertainty in these factors creates
challenges for traditional approaches to the governance of
transboundary water resources. 
This research is an outgrowth of the work of the Universities
Consortium on Columbia River Governance focused on
transboundary water governance. It uses the natural laboratory
of the Columbia basin, shared by the United States and Canada,
as a focal point for discussion. Joint operation of the river for
hydropower production and flood control is governed by a
1964 treaty (hereafter, the Treaty). Certain flood control
provisions of the Treaty expire in 2024, and either country
must provide 10 yr notice should it seek to terminate the Treaty.
Thus, efforts are underway in the basin that attempt to predict
changes and to understand whether the predicted changes
warrant Treaty modification. In addition, many view Treaty
review as an opportunity to connect domestic and local efforts
on ecosystem restoration to international operations under the
Treaty and to bring greater transparency and avenues for public
input to implementation decisions. The degree of uncertainty
surrounding the drivers of change complicates these efforts
and has led to a search for an approach to governance that
accounts for uncertainty, rather than seeking further
technological means to constrain it. 
In complex systems that have high degrees of uncertainty, like
the Columbia River, emerging theories point to the importance
of assessing and actively managing system resilience, i.e., the
extent to which a system can absorb recurrent natural and
human perturbations and continue to maintain essential
function without slowly degrading or even unexpectedly
flipping into a less desirable state (Folke et al. 2005). System
management for resilience, as opposed to management to
optimize a single resource function (e.g., hydropower
production), introduces its own uncertainties as a result of the
complex interactions and feedbacks within the system
(Holling and Gunderson 2002). Thus, proponents of
management for resilience suggest the use of adaptive
management to allow adjustments in the face of change
(Holling 1978, Lee 1999, Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al.
2009) while noting that a change to management focused on
ecosystem resilience will “require new forms of human
behavior with a shift in perspective from the aspiration to
control change in systems, assumed to be stable, to sustain and
generate desirable pathways for societal development in the
face of increased frequency of abrupt change” (Folke et al.
2005:443). 
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Human behavior, however, does not shift in perspective
simply because science indicates it is the right thing to do.
Acceptance of decisions, whether supported by science or not,
requires legitimacy in the actions of the institutions of
governance that are making and implementing those decisions.
Legitimacy is challenged by the degree of flexibility required
by adaptive management. For resilience scientists, there is
currently a gap between theory and application. On the one
side, they recognize that adaptive management is an
appropriate management tool in the face of uncertainty.
However, they also recognize the difficulty in achieving
practical implementation of adaptive management. This gap
may be bridged by recognizing the difference between
scientific accuracy and social legitimacy and the full
integration of the social component. It is not enough that
monitoring and incremental adjustment will provide the best
ecological results in the face of uncertainty. The decisions
whether to use adaptive management, what to monitor, and
how to make incremental adjustment must be made in a
manner that fosters legitimacy. 
Thus, achieving the implementation of adaptive management
requires attention to the process of governance used to carry
it out. In this context, “governance is the process of resolving
trade-offs and of providing a vision and direction for
sustainability, management is the operationalization of this
vision...” (Boyle et al. 2001:122). By its definition, governance
will involve trade-offs and thus may not lead to the perfect
scientific result for the ecological system. However, the flaw
in implementing adaptive management without integrating the
social component is that it makes the same mistake as
traditional management by optimizing for a subset of the
system, i.e., the ecosystem. Coupled with adaptive
management, an appropriate form of governance addresses
the entire social-ecological system. 
Our work builds upon the work of scientists to define criteria
for adaptive governance by turning to legal scholarship on
legitimacy to explain why certain aspects of governance are
necessary if flexible, experimental approaches to management
are to gain acceptance. It uses a framework on legitimacy
developed by Cosens (2010, 2012) and summarized next to
argue for a renewed but restructured attempt at adaptive
management within a framework of adaptive governance
applied to the Columbia River basin social-ecological system.
ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY
In resilience literature, scholars use the term governance to
describe the laws, policies, regulations, institutions, and
institutional structures involved in governing (Folke et al.
2005, Huitema et al. 2009). The term adaptive management
has been used to describe a process of learning through
monitoring ecosystem response to a particular action, followed
by incremental change in the action based on what is learned
(Holling 1978, Lee 1999, Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al.
2009). Adaptive management is only one of many
management approaches that a system of governance might
use to implement its policies. It is an approach designed to
address the inherent uncertainties in a system’s response to
management changes. It has also been viewed as an alternative
to traditional forms of resource management that focus on
optimizing for specific aspects of an ecosystem that match
current economic needs or political goals. The failure of
management through optimization to retain the full range of
ecosystem services is a key message of scholars working on
resilience theory (Walker and Salt 2006, Zellmer and
Gunderson 2009). 
The term adaptive governance has been employed to describe
a governance process that responds to feedback received by a
managing agency from monitoring the response of the
ecosystem (i.e., adaptive management). It does this through
collaboration and cooperation across different levels of
government, non-governmental, and individual actions and
among agencies within the same level of government with
overlapping authority (Folke et al. 2005). Boyle et al.
(2001:122) help clarify the difference between governance
and adaptive management by stating that “governance is the
process of resolving trade-offs and of providing a vision and
direction for sustainability, management is the operationalization
of this vision...” We use the term adaptive governance to
indicate the type of governance necessary to allow sufficient
flexibility for adaptive management. 
Adaptive governance moves from a focus on efficiency and
lack of overlap among jurisdictional authorities to a focus on
diversity, redundancy, and multiple levels of management that
include local knowledge and local action. Huitema et al. (2009)
set forth four criteria for adaptive governance: polycentricity
(also referred to as legal pluralism in legal scholarship; Roth
et al. 2005), public participation, an experimental approach to
resource management, and management at the bioregional
scale. One problem in evaluating these components of
adaptive governance is the inability to measure the effects of
implementing each criterion. 
Huitema et al. (2009) find no concrete evidence that
polycentric governance is more flexible and less vulnerable
(key goals for facilitation of resilience) than traditional,
hierarchical forms of governance. Instead, they find that
numerous case studies suggest the effectiveness of the
polycentric approach for large-scale, common-pool resources
(Langston 2003, Huitema et al. 2009). They also note, “there
is little empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the river-
basin approach, either in its monocentric form (unitary river-
basin authorities) or its polycentric form (collaboration at the
basin scale), in the literature discussed here. Dinar et al.
suggest that basin-level governance institutions are a
necessary but insufficient condition for successful resource
management, meaning that the absence of such institutions
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will lead to the failure of management but their presence does
not necessarily lead to success,” Huitema et al. (2009:10;
citations omitted). 
Legal scholars may not find this lack of ability to monitor and
provide quantitative proof of effectiveness as disturbing as
scientists might. The very nature of complex social-ecological
systems, the fact that no two large-scale systems are exactly
alike, and the fact that no system is ever identical at two
different points in time, renders it impossible to make a
controlled comparison of polycentric and hierarchical
governance. More importantly, legal scholarship adds a
different approach to analyzing the necessary components of
adaptive governance. Rather than asking how to measure
whether the criteria that define adaptive governance lead to
better results, the disciplinary perspective we accept here is
the need for a more flexible and experimental approach to
water resource management in the face of uncertainty and
applies the legal and political science literature to understand
the components necessary for public acceptance (legitimacy)
of that approach. The following paragraphs summarize the
requirements necessary to assure legitimacy in governmental
decision making that employs an experimental approach to
resource management. This is followed by discussion of their
relation to the criteria for adaptive governance set forth by
Huitema et al. (2009) of polycentricity, public participation,
an experimental approach to resource management, and
bioregional scale. 
Legitimacy is a qualitative term used here to describe the
persuasiveness of the basis for a governmental action
(Bodansky 1999). It is a fundamental premise of political
theory that people seek legitimacy in the actions of those who
govern them. The concept has both normative and popular
aspects. Thus, to be legitimate, a governmental assertion of
authority must be justified (normative) and perceived to be
justified (popular; Bodansky 1999). 
In the historic range of governmental systems, democracy
emerges as a system with a high level of legitimacy because
people consent to their leadership through the process of
electing those who govern. The increasing implementation of
the law by administrative officials, as opposed to elected
officials, dilutes the direct connection between the elected
official and the voters affected by regulation. Clearly this
challenges the legitimacy of decision making even in a
democracy. To address this issue in the growing administrative
state, administrative law has developed to fill the gap by
governing the processes followed by the agencies that are
delegated authority to implement the law. Introducing
flexibility to water resource management to allow adaptive
management can challenge the administrative processes
currently used to assure legitimacy and lead to opposition to
adopting new approaches. Analysis of the underlying basis for
process elements currently employed in administrative law to
assure legitimacy is a starting point for developing additional
tools to assure legitimacy in a more flexible approach to
management. 
Of the five sources of legitimacy in the administrative process
outlined by Esty (2006), three are of primary consideration for
the implementation of adaptive management: (1) results
based: legitimacy derived from the use of objective expertise
as the basis for decisions and the ability to determine whether
the results are good; (2) order based: legitimacy derived from
the adherence by the administrative agency to rules that are
clear, stable, and publicly available; and (3) deliberative:
legitimacy derived from reliance on a public dialog in the
process of decision making. We describe and apply these three
sources of legitimacy to the concept of adaptive governance
in the following paragraphs. A more thorough discussion of
legitimacy and its relation to management for resilience is the
topic of other articles by Cosens (2010, 2012); it will be
summarized here.
Results-based legitimacy
Administrative agencies develop results-based legitimacy
through reliance on scientific expertise. This began in the
United States with federal management of the forests based
on forestry science (16 U.S.C. §§ 473-478, 479-482, and 551,
June 4, 1897, as amended 1905, 1911, 1925, 1962, 1964, 1968,
and 1976). The premise behind science-based decision making
is that the process will be objective and the results will
improve. The use of scientific expertise as a source of
legitimacy is increasingly questioned as agency science shows
vulnerability to politicization (Wagner 1995, Doremus and
Tarlock 2005, O’Reilly 2007, Cosens 2008, Ruhl and Salzman
2010); however, implementation of adaptive management
may serve to cure that vulnerability (Camacho 2009). 
Adaptive management, Huitema et al.’s (2009) “experimental
approach to management,” requires that the results of an
agency action be monitored and that the action be adjusted
based on the monitoring. Under the current approach to
science-based management, substantial resources may be
allocated to studying a problem in the process of developing
a solution; however, data are rarely gathered to verify the
results of a particular action (Shabman et al. 2007, Camacho
2009). Furthermore, even if data were collected following
agency action, agencies rarely have the authority to modify
the action without going back through the rulemaking process,
or in some cases, without new legislation. Although reluctance
to provide authority for flexible implementation may lie in
part in failure to fund monitoring (Shabman et al. 2007,
Camacho 2009), it also reflects a failure to tie adjustment based
on monitoring to agency accountability. Actual measurement
of results and adjustment in the face of those measurements
will enhance results-based legitimacy. It will also reduce the
use of science to achieve the goals of a particular interest group.
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Order-based legitimacy
Order-based legitimacy addresses the need for stability and
finality in regulations that affect economic pursuits. Sources
of order-based legitimacy in administrative process include
rulemaking and judicial review of administrative actions. In
the United States, agencies promulgate rules to govern
implementation of laws passed by Congress. Rulemaking
facilitates the application of law to the regulated community
in an equal and uniform manner. Proposed rules are subject to
notice and comment, thus increasing the possibility that
unintended consequences will be found and addressed before
final rules are in place (U.S. Administrative Procedure Act 5
USC §553). The knowledge that the same rules will be applied
to all creates a level playing field and provides stability for
economic pursuits. Finality is achieved through the judicial
review process that allows affected parties to challenge both
rules and administrative actions under the rules (U.S.
Administrative Procedure Act 5 USC § 704). Once review of
a particular issue makes its way through the courts, res
judicata, the concept that a final decision by a court on an issue
is conclusive as between the same parties, and stare decises, 
the judicial policy of following earlier decisions by the same
court, prevent or discourage re-litigation to achieve a different
outcome, thus providing finality. 
The desire for stability and finality is in direct conflict with
the flexibility needed for adaptive management. The
communication gap between those advocating adaptive
management and those seeking finality is found in many legal
battles concerning natural resources and the environment and
arises from a basic conflict between the goals of science and
law. The scientific process is a neverending search for the
truth. Litigation is a process intended to reach final resolution
(Cosens 2008). Scientific inquiry has no concept of res
judicata or stare decises. Instead, scientific methodology is a
process of disproving what was formerly thought to be true,
with continued re-investigation of questions thought solved
and re-interpretation of theories in light of new discoveries
(Kosso 2007). Civil litigation serves economic purposes. The
goal is final resolution of a dispute to facilitate a return to
economic pursuits. Although truth is sought within the limits
of the information available at the time, final, peaceful dispute
resolution is given higher value than truth. Similarly, the
current process of rulemaking is designed to consider the issue
once and then proceed under a final rule rather than to re-
examine and adjust to the results of the rule’s implementation.
In disputes concerning the environment, civil litigation serves
economic interests by providing stability; science serves
environmental interests by continuing the search for the true
cause of environmental harm. In this framework, adaptive
management, with its continuing adjustment based on science,
serves environmental interests but may introduce instability
for economic interests. 
Bridging this gap first requires an understanding that the
environmental community has not been silent in the face of a
system of civil litigation that was not designed to achieve their
goals. Once the environmental community has exhausted its
options within the judicial system, the issues will be revisited
in the relevant legislature or Congress. Once all options have
been exhausted within the political system, the issues might
even be addressed through civil disobedience. An apt example
is the endless litigation on the Columbia River over
anadromous fish (discussed below) that has led to gridlock in
recovery efforts. It is possible that the gridlock in the current
system may encourage parties to seek an alternative. 
Addressing concerns for stability and finality requires
attention to the timeframe for incremental adjustment of
management measures. Bringing legitimacy to the
incremental approach of adaptive management requires equal
treatment of both the economic need for finality and the
progress toward the true system understanding needed to
address environmental concerns. Examples suggest that
currently, management relying on monitoring for adjustment
uses a biological timeframe when the management action is
developed by a science-based agency (e.g., see U.S.
Geological Survey Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, basing
monitoring on biological goals), and uses social timeframes
when negotiated (e.g., see Snake River Water Rights
Settlement 2004 Mediator’s Term Sheet of April 20, 2004,
placing a 30-yr timeframe on a biological opinion to provide
stability for water users in the region). To foster ecological
resilience while maintaining legitimacy, both ecological and
social timeframes must be built into rulemaking for any
adaptive management process. 
It is also important to note that a current problem with order-
based legitimacy may actually be addressed by adaptive
governance. Fragmentation of water management due to
jurisdictional boundaries that may reflect political boundaries
among governments or subject matter boundaries among
agencies not only frustrates efforts to address an ecosystem as
a whole, it also frustrates the regulated community faced with
piecemeal and conflicting approaches. The need to address
this issue provides support for seeking the ability to coordinate
at a bioregional scale in adaptive governance. Research on the
use of formal and informal networks to coordinate across
multiple entities may provide valuable insights into the
management of polycentricity (e.g., Bodin and Crona 2009,
Zaring 2009, Ruhl and Salzman 2010).
Deliberative legitimacy
Deliberative legitimacy is reflected in the growing expectation
for public involvement in all aspects of governance and in
particular with environmental governance (Hirt and Sowards
2012). It is addressed in agency decision making in the United
States in both administrative and substantive environmental
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law. Administrative law requires notice and comment in
rulemaking (5 USC §553), open meetings (5 USC §552b) in
which public officials are engaged in decision making, and
open public records (5 USC §552). In substantive law, the
passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in
1969 can be considered the major turning point in public
involvement in agency decision making (Hirt and Sowards
2012). NEPA conforms with administrative law requirements
that meetings and records be open to the public. However, it
goes beyond the administrative law requirements by imposing
the affirmative duty on agencies to develop and analyze
information on the environmental impact of major federal
actions and provide the information to the public for comment
(U.S. National Environmental Policy Act 42 USC §4332).
Although NEPA does not impose any substantive requirement
to choose the most environmentally sustainable alternative
(Vermont Nuclear Power Corp. vs. NRDC, 1978), it arms the
public with the information necessary to participate in shaping
the decision through the political process. 
The continued criticism of agency decision making in the
United States suggests that public meetings and even the
provision of information on environmental impact are
insufficient to provide deliberative legitimacy. Adaptive
governance requires more than public comment, it requires
meaningful public comment; this is a two way flow of
information in which governmental agencies work not only to
provide information from their own expertise, but to also
incorporate local knowledge and work toward a greater role
for public input in decision making (McKinney and Harmon
2004). Without strong local capacity building and a
meaningful role for local decision making, these requirements
of public comment may amount to more form than substance. 
Discussions of polycentric governance and legal pluralism
view local capacity building for purposes of self-governance
as key to effective governance (Hanna 2008, Raadgever et al.
2008, Huitema et al. 2009). Achieving this would require both
the infusion of education and resources at the local level and
local authority within the decision making network.
Polycentric government differs from the move for local control
in past Western U.S. efforts such as the Sagebrush Rebellion
and the county supremacy movement, which advocate total
local control over local natural resource issues concerning
federal land. Instead, polycentric governance would require
granting a larger voice and decision-making power locally
while retaining a network with state and federal government.
Small-scale spatial and temporal impacts may be reflected best
in local knowledge, improving the knowledge base for a
decision. Local experimentation with adaptive management
within a stable state or federal framework may meet both the
requirements of order-based legitimacy while allowing more
robust avenues for deliberation. This redundancy in
government, viewed as inefficient in the past, enhances
adaptive capacity. 
Application of this analysis to the Columbia River basin
requires an understanding of human development of the basin,
the opportunity presented by review of the Columbia River
Treaty (Treaty between Canada and the United States of
America Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water
Resources of The Columbia River Basin [Columbia River
Treaty], United States-Canada, January 17, 1961, URL: http://
www.ccrh.org/comm/river/docs/cotreaty.htm), and analysis
of the previous attempt to implement adaptive management
in the U.S. portion of the river.
THE COLUMBIA RIVER
The Columbia River basin covers 259,500 square miles
(672,102 km²) in Canada and the United States, with an
average annual runoff of 200 million acre-feet (approximately
247 million m³; Barton and Ketchum 2012). The basin includes
portions of seven U.S. states, i.e., Washington, Oregon, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming, and the province of
British Columbia in Canada. Despite the fact that only 15%
of the basin lies within Canada, 38% of the average annual
flow and 50% of the peak flow originates in Canada (Shurts
2012). Importantly, because runoff from snowpack occurs
later in the higher latitudes of Canada, 50% of the critical late
summer flow may originate there (Hamlet 2003). This
seasonal variability in unregulated peak flow is 1:34, a large
range compared to that of other major North American rivers,
for example, a mere 1:2 on the St. Lawrence River and 1:25
on the Mississippi River (Hamlet 2003). The variability caused
20th century boosters to seek to harness the river’s potential
for irrigation and energy through storage (Hirt and Sowards
2012). Current storage capacity on the river is 40% of the
average annual flow, which is substantially less than that on
the Mississippi River (200%) and the Colorado River (400–
500%). The basin relies on natural storage from snowpack to
meet current uses of the river. Adaptation will be required of
the basin because of increasingly reduced snowpack caused
by climate change (Hamlet 2003). 
In 1805, when the Lewis and Clark expedition made its way
down the Columbia River to Astoria, there were no dams.
Salmon fisheries sustained the native population. Falls slowed
upriver migration of salmon and provided excellent fishing
locations. Each year, thousands of Native Americans from
numerous tribes gathered at locations such as Celilo Falls (now
inundated by water behind the Dalles Dam) to fish and trade
(Hirt 2008, Landeen and Pinkham 2008). This human
adaptation to the ecological system was soon to change.
Competition from commercial fishing and an influx of
canneries began in 1866. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) began transforming the Columbia River for
navigation with locks at the Cascades as early as 1896, with
numerous dams to follow (White 1995). Most dams in the U.
S. portion of the river mainstem generated hydropower and
aided navigation but did not store substantial water (Shurts
2012). Exceptions to this run-of-the-river approach were the
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Grand Coulee Dam, a federal facility, which was completed
on the mainstem in 1942 for irrigation and permanently
blocked salmon runs from reaching Canada, and the Hungry
Horse Dam, completed on the tributary the South Fork of the
Flathead in 1953 (Shurts 2012). In 1948, even though the total
river flow was near average, runoff occurred rapidly and
peaked with a flood in May that destroyed the town of Vanport,
Oregon, with estimated flow of > 1 million cubic feet per
second (28,317 m³/s; average peak flows are less than half that
rate; Barton and Ketchum 2012). At the time of the 1948 flood,
total storage capacity on the Columbia River was
approximately 6% of the average annual flow (White 2012).
Compare this to the Colorado River’s storage capacity of more
than four times its average annual flow or the Missouri River’s
storage capacity more than two times its average annual flow
(Barton and Ketchum 2012). The approach at the time to
Columbia basin flood control issues, which were implemented
by the USACE, was to address flood control through storage.
However, the USACE was confronted by the fact that the best
remaining water storage sites were not located in the United
States, but in Canada. 
Even before the 1948 flood, the International Joint
Commission formed by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
between the United States and Canada was directed to study
the possibility of storage within Canada to provide flood
control or power benefits to both countries (Mouat 2012,
Shurts 2012). The Columbia River Treaty, which would form
the framework to accomplish this task, was not adopted until
1964. Possibly the biggest obstacle to its completion was the
fact that the three new dams contemplated would all be in
British Columbia while the majority of flood control and
hydropower benefits would be in the United States (Mouat
2012, Shurts 2012). Between 1961 and 1964, negotiations
between the federal government of Canada and the province
of British Columbia resulted in turning the operation and
benefits under the Treaty over to British Columbia; the
operations benefits would be divided between the United
States and British Columbia (Hirt and Sowards 2012, Mouat
2012, Shurts 2012). The resulting solution has been held
throughout the world as the pinnacle of international
cooperation on non-navigational uses of freshwater sources
(Barton and Ketchum 2012). 
The Treaty provided for appointment of operating entities by
the United States and British Columbia. The United States
selected the Administrator of the Bonneville Power
Administration and Division Engineer of the Northwestern
Division U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Executive Order
11,177, 29 Federal Register 13097, September 16, 1964).
British Columbia selected BC Hydro (Barton and Ketchum
2012). The entities operate under strict Treaty provisions and
do not have decision-making power to modify or adapt the
Treaty or to act on public comment. 
One further complication needed to be addressed before the
Treaty could be completed. In 1964, the Pacific Northwest did
not need all of the power the new projects would generate.
This problem was solved when Congress authorized
construction of the Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest
Intertie, allowing the sale of power to utilities in the
southwestern United States, with a preference for sale to
northwest utilities (Pacific Northwest Consumer Power
Preference Act, 16 U.S.C. § 837. 2006). This resulted in an
interconnected North American power grid. 
Certain flood control provisions, paid for upfront by the United
States to cover 60 yr, expire in 2024 (Treaty Article IV). The
Treaty contains no automatic termination date or renegotiation
clause; 2024 is the earliest date either party may unilaterally
terminate the Treaty (Treaty Article XIX). At least ten years
notice of termination must be provided; hence, the entities in
the basin are focused on a thorough review of the Treaty before
2014. This has led to consideration of whether the time is ripe
for Treaty modification (Shurts 2012), and many others see
this as an opportunity to raise concerns with ecosystem health
to the international scale. 
Substantial changes in the basin have also led many to see
Treaty review as an opportunity to update water management
in the basin. The operating entities are studying options to
explore before 2014 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
Bonneville Power Administration, Columbia River Treaty:
2012/2024 Review: Phase 1 Technical Studies 2009). A
process of stakeholder input has begun on each side of the
border. This review process provides an opportunity to
consider governance of the basin in light of its adaptive
capacity. Interviews with basin stakeholders suggest an
interest in consideration of ecosystem function as a third
purpose of the treaty, along with greater public involvement
in both its negotiation and implementation (McKinney et al.
2010, University of Idaho and Oregon State University
unpublished manuscript; http://water.oregonstate.edu/sites/
default/files/ui_osu_crt_scenario_development__combined_report_-
_final1.pdf). Viewing Treaty review as an opportunity to
consider new approaches to river management requires
understanding of the changes in the basin since 1964. 
A symposium on the Columbia River Treaty held by the
University of Idaho in collaboration with other basin
universities in 2009 examined change and associated
uncertainties both within and affecting the basin since 1964
in five categories: (1) change in values concerning the river;
(2) change in the viability of populations of anadromous fish
that spawn within the Columbia River system; (3) change in
energy demand; (4) climate change; and (5) change in
empowerment of local communities and, in particular, of
Native American and First Nation governments. The
following paragraphs will briefly summarize some of the
important points raised at the symposium. A more complete
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summary is provided by Cosens (2010). It is important to note
that not all of these changes are of equal importance to the two
countries comprising the basin. Addressing change at the
appropriate scale, rather than folding all issues into the
international treaty, will be one of the important considerations
in building capacity for adaptive governance. 
Changes in societal values concerning the river are reflected
in the adoption of new laws governing both the substance and
process of natural resource management (Hirt and Sowards
2012). These new laws include the U.S. Endangered Species
Act (ESA), adopted in 1973, which forbids federal actions that
jeopardize listed species (16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. 2006).
Eight salmon and four steelhead species that rely on habitat
within the basin have been listed in the United States, although
numerous factors affect these species. Operation of the Federal
Columbia River Power System (the part of the hydropower
system at federal dams in the U.S. portion of the basin), has
been the subject of numerous lawsuits under the ESA. 
Dramatic changes in the health of the Columbia River
ecosystem are reflected in the declines of populations of
anadromous fish that spawn within the system and the
blockage of anadromous fish from 37% of their former
spawning grounds, including all of the river in Canada, by
dams. Salmon have declined from an estimated high of 6–16
million in the early 1880s to < 1 million today (Peery 2012).
The salmon fishery in the Columbia River basin is now
supported by approximately 200 hatcheries (Peery 2012). It is
difficult to argue that these changes were not foreseen (Bottom
et al. 2009), but the value placed on the fisheries clearly has
shifted. 
In a 2009 special feature of Ecology and Society titled
“Pathways to Resilient Salmon Ecosystems,” scientists
explored the prospects for Pacific salmon, including Columbia
River populations. In contrast to the single population of
Atlantic salmon, Pacific salmon have adapted to the relatively
dynamic geological coastline and riverine environment of the
west coast of North America through the development of
multiple locally adapted populations (Waples et al. 2009). The
10-million-year survival of Pacific salmon in the face of a
highly dynamic coastal environment is a tribute to their
resilience (Healey 2009). However, anthropogenic changes
have occurred on both a scale and timeframe that does not
match historical geological variability in the system (Healey
2009). Thus, the key to restoring salmon resilience is not
merely to maintain genetic diversity through hatcheries, but
to re-establish the natural processes that led to adaptation
(Healey 2009). Because salmon require the entire length of a
river system, as well as the ocean, to complete their life cycle,
this would require a daunting level of cross-jurisdictional
coordination (Bottom et al. 2009). 
Blockage of salmon from Canada by dams and new reliance
on resident fisheries in the portions of the basin that no longer
see salmon runs alters the dialogue surrounding ecosystem
health in that portion of the river. Lake levels and release rates
also affect these fisheries, just as they affect anadromous fish.
Thus, even if the two nations comprising the basin have a
different focus for ecosystem health domestically,
coordination will be necessary for sustained health. 
In addition, energy demand has not unfolded as was
anticipated in 1964. When the 1964 Treaty was finalized,
planners expected the rapid growth in power demand that
followed World War II to continue. They expected new
thermal generation to replace hydropower as the dominant
source of energy in the Pacific Northwest (Shurts 2012).
Conservation nation-wide in the wake of the 1970s energy
crisis altered this picture, and hydropower remains the
dominant energy source in the region (Hirt and Sowards 2012).
Correspondingly, the system’s value has grown dramatically.
With the current push to develop non-carbon sources of
energy, hydropower is likely to become even more valuable.
The draft power plan released in September 2009 by the
Northwest Power and Conservation Council indicates that “the
most cost effective and least risky resource for the region” to
meet electricity demand over the next 20 years “is improved
efficiency of electricity use” (Northwest Power and
Conservation Council 2010). Despite the 20-yr projections of
the Council, energy demand and supply technology going
forward may be just as unpredictable. Technology innovations
in utility-scale storage, for example, could free up river
operations for other purposes. 
Under the 1964 Treaty, a high level of cooperation and joint
planning for river operation occurs among the appointed
operating entities. However, the type of agency-level (or
entity-level) operational planning envisioned by the 1964
Treaty depends on seasonal and yearly variation that can be
forecast within the degrees of historical variability. Six-year,
one-year, and within-year planning cycles, as well as
Supplemental Operating Agreements are used if mutual
benefits in power, flood control, fisheries, or other values may
be achieved (Barton and Ketchum 2012). In this way, the
Treaty provides sufficient flexibility for adaptive management
to account for seasonal and yearly uncertainty within the
limited purposes of the Treaty. 
Unfortunately, climate change predictions indicate that the
range of variation will be greater than the variation predicted
based on historical behavior (Hamlet 2003). Modeling by the
Climate Impacts Group suggests that precipitation may not
change dramatically within the Columbia River basin, albeit
substantial uncertainty is associated with this statement
(Hamlet 2003). However, changes in annual snowpack, which
can be predicted with greater certainty, are already underway
in the basin (Hamlet 2003, Nolin et al. 2012). The basin relies
on snowpack as natural storage that, similar to reservoirs,
moderates summer flows. With climate change, reduction in
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snow-water equivalent may be as much as 35% in the U.S.
portion of the basin by 2060 and 12% in the Canadian portion
of the basin (Hamlet 2003, Nolin et al. 2012). This reduction
in natural storage means that the artificial storage
configuration in the basin will be insufficient to reap the power
benefits available in the past (Hamlet 2003). In particular,
summer production, which serves utilities in the southwestern
United States, will decrease if the current configuration is
maintained (Hamlet 2003). Situations out of the historical
water supply regime have impacts beyond power production.
The Columbia River Treaty provides an excellent framework
to address high flow. However, it does not address low flow
under a climate change scenario (Hamlet 2003). Adaptation
to climate change for other uses such as irrigation and fisheries
requires responses by multiple agencies in the United States,
with no framework for coordination (Hamlet 2003). Irrigation
occurs during the summer, when the lowest flows will occur
if storage is insufficient. If there is a failure to address low
flows, the fish and farmers will bear the brunt of climate change
(Hamlet 2003). 
A more subtle yet pervasive change in laws governing process
stems from the now global demand for greater public access
to information and participation in governmental decision
making. In the United States, the indications of this trend began
with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966
(5 U.S.C. §552. 2006) and the National Environmental Policy
Act in 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852. 1970; current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 2006; Hirt and Sowards 2012). 
A reconnaissance-level situation assessment of stakeholders
in the Columbia River basin was done by students at the
University of Montana under the direction of consortium
member Dr. Matthew McKinney (McKinney et al. 2010). This
assessment, along with subsequent interviews done by
students at the University of Idaho and Oregon State
University (unpublished manuscript) confirmed the
expectation of public input within the basin and identified
several key perceptions. Among the key issues identified by
stakeholders that were not addressed in 1964 but should be in
the future is participation by affected communities, including
Native American tribes and First Nations. This perception is
paralleled by the dramatic change in empowerment among
basin communities. 
The following factors, detailed in Cosens (2010), have
increased empowerment of local communities and, in
particular, of Native American and First Nation governments
resulting in enhanced capacity to participate in Columbia
River decision making: (1) legal recognition of the treaty rights
of certain Native American tribes to participate in the harvest
and management of Columbia basin fisheries within the
United States, now organized as the Columbia River Intertribal
Fish Commission; (2) recognition of the upper basin tribes
within the United States whose land was blocked from
anadromous fish migration by the Grand Coulee Dam,
organized as the Upper Columbia United Tribes; (3)
establishment of the Northwest Power and Conservation
Council in the United States in 1980, composed of state
representatives in the United States portion of the basin and
charged with energy and fisheries restoration planning; (4)
Constitutional recognition of the rights of First Nations in
Canada in 1982; and (5) legislative recognition of the
Columbia Basin Trust in Canada in 1995, formed initially as
a grassroots effort to assert the rights of local communities
and First Nations whose lands were flooded by Treaty dams.
Many of these groups advocate restoration of the health of
anadromous fish runs in the basin, although some have shifted
focus to resident fish and cultural restitution in areas blocked
from salmon runs. These changes parallel the growing call for
public participation in resource management decisions and the
need for local capacity building to make this input a reality.
They provide the base from which public processes can be
built into adaptive governance. 
Adaptive management was attempted in the late 1980s to early
1990s in the U.S. portion of the Columbia River basin as part
of a fish and wildlife restoration effort, and failed. That failure
must be assessed if consideration of a new attempt is to be
credible. The following section relies on the extensive
analyses of that failure to place it in the context of the
differences between adaptive management and adaptive
governance and the framework for legitimacy.
MOVING FROM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT TO
ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE
The Northwest Power Act of 1980 (Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501,
94 Stat. 2697) brought great hope to those interested in
restoring anadromous fish runs in the U.S. portion of the
Columbia River basin. The Act is an interstate compact
approved by the legislatures of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and
Washington, and by Congress to give the four states a greater
role in decision making with respect to electric power and fish
and wildlife in the U.S. portion of the Columbia River basin.
The resulting Northwest Power and Conservation Council
(hereafter, the Council) comprises two political appointees
from each state, has legal and technical staff, and is funded
through power revenues from the Bonneville Power
Administration. The Council has three primary objectives: (1)
develop a 20-yr electric power plan that will guarantee
adequate and reliable energy at the lowest economic and
environmental cost to the Northwest; (2) develop a program
to protect and rebuild fish and wildlife populations affected
by hydropower development in the Columbia River basin; and
(3) educate and involve the public in the Council’s decision-
making processes. 
The Act requires all actions of the Bonneville Power
Administration to be consistent with the Council’s electric
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power plan. In contrast, the fish and wildlife program is
intended to be based on input from states, tribes, and federal
agencies, and to complement their activities, but no authority
is granted to the Council or the Bonneville Power
Administration to reconcile the fish and wildlife program with
hydropower operations in the basin (Volkman and
McConnaha 1993). Hope that the Council’s activities would
reverse the decline of anadromous fish was sufficiently high
that a process for listing of spring chinook salmon under the
ESA was set aside pending implementation of the new
program (McConnaha and Paquet 1996). 
Washington appointee to the Council, Dr. Kai Lee, introduced
the concept of adaptive management in the initial years of
implementation of the Act (Volkman and McConnaha 1993,
see also Lee 1993, 1999). Adaptive management was
embraced for application of the fish and wildlife program
restoration activities initially, then extended to mainstem flow
operations by amendments to the program in 1994
(Independent Scientific Group 1996, Blumm 2002). This
extension was never implemented. Its implementation was
rejected when the political make-up of Council members
changed (McConnaha and Paquet 1996, Blumm 2002). Re-
consideration was preempted by listing under the ESA
(discussed as an attractive alternative below). The effort to
apply adaptive management to fish and wildlife restoration
activities failed. If adaptive management is to be
recommended as one tool for moving the Columbia River
basin toward a more resilient social-ecological system, it is
first necessary to analyze why the original experiment in
adaptive management failed, and second, by viewing it
through the framework of legitimacy, to consider whether
there is any reason to believe it would succeed if tried again. 
Published analyses of attempted adaptive management on the
U.S. portion of the Columbia River basin suggest a variety of
reasons for failure that generally fit into four categories:
implementation, geographic scale, time scale, and attractive
alternative. Each of these categories is discussed below in the
context of legitimacy, followed by a discussion of the
Council’s efforts in public participation, which are closer to
the model sought for legitimacy in adaptive governance.
Implementation
Analyses by both program participants and an independent
group of scientists indicate that the crucial steps in adaptive
management of monitoring, evaluation, and adjustment were
not rigorously adhered to in the Council’s effort. Monitoring
focused on salmon rather than the key ecological features
needed to support them (Independent Scientific Group 1986),
leading to a bias in favor of hatchery programs rather than
attention to the full range of ecosystem function. The cost of
monitoring tended to result in its elimination from project
funding (Lee and Lawrence 1986). To assure results-based
legitimacy, goal setting followed by monitoring of actions
must be presented to legislative appropriation committees as
vital program components needed to assure agency
accountability. Giving a program the tools to demonstrate that
its actions are either moving the ecological system in the
direction of its ecological goals or that adjustments must be
made if they are not is the key to returning legitimacy to results-
based decision making. 
Where monitoring was used in the Council’s program,
evaluation of results occurred at the program level by policy
and decision makers, not by independent scientists
(Independent Scientific Group 1996). This eliminated the
opportunity to make scientific adjustments to monitoring to
reduce uncertainty (McConnaha and Paquet 1996). Huitema
et al. (2009) note that Lee’s (1999) description of involving
decision makers is closer to the model for adaptive
governance. However, it may also reflect a failure to
distinguish between governance and implementation of
management. To maintain the integrity of results-based
legitimacy, scientific monitoring results must be interpreted
by scientists. Likewise, the recommendation for adjustments
must also come from the scientific community. Science-based
recommendations may be rejected in the process of making
trade-offs, but by doing so in open deliberative processes
rather than hiding the rejection in the uncertainty surrounding
the science, the possibility of resorting to the status quo is
reduced and the transparency necessary for legitimacy is
enhanced. 
Implementation problems can also be addressed through
attention to deliberative legitimacy. Goal setting must be done
through a deliberative process by bringing together scientific
expertise to identify measurable goals and public input at the
scale of the impact of the particular action. Monitoring must
be funded and employed to measure variables that are relevant
to the goal set. The analysis and adjustment stage then becomes
the avenue to results-based legitimacy. 
The decision to extend adaptive management to mitigation of
mainstem power operations on fish was never implemented.
A barrier to its success, had it been implemented, was the fact
that the fish and wildlife program could only guide, not control,
decisions on power operations (Volkman and McConnaha
1993). As noted, under the 1964 Treaty, changes to power
operations to accommodate fish migration have taken place.
However, the benefit to Canada of U.S. power production is
calculated without recognizing those accommodations. The
fact that the United States loses power generation for fish
flows, then provides power benefits to Canada as if that loss
did not occur, creates a disincentive to alter operations for fish.
The elevation of ecosystem function to an international
consideration provides a forum for decision making in which
both the action (power generation) and its impact on the
ecosystem are deliberated at the same scale and level of
governance.
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Geographic scale
Analyses indicate that the lack of overarching authority in a
jurisdictionally complex basin, the difficulty of experimental
design, and concern over experimentation with species,
thought by some to be on the brink of extinction, all plagued
the Council’s fish and wildlife program. Potentially, the
greatest barrier to success lay in the competing and conflicting
goals between the Council’s stated objective to develop a fish
and wildlife program and international operation of the river
for the primary purposes of hydropower and flood control.
Had implementation and time scale issues been cured, it is
likely that the Council’s adaptive management program would
have worked well on the sub-basin scale. The problems in
moving to an adaptive approach applied to actions that have
implications at a basin-wide scale, such as mainstem dam
operation, are twofold. 
First, the complexity of experimental design and meaningful
monitoring at this scale cannot be fully eliminated.
Experimentation on the scale of an entire river basin is both
jurisdictionally (Lee and Lawrence 1986, McConnaha and
Paquet 1996) and scientifically complex (McConnaha and
Paquet 1996) and possibly unwise given that the risk of failure
extends to the entire basin. These problems are compounded
when the species in question is in decline. Because large-scale
experimentation on species in decline has high risks, it is
extremely difficult to generate the political will to act
(Volkman and McConnaha 1993). Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize that dam construction and daily dam
operations are themselves major experiments in ecological
resilience. Viewed through this lens, if the problem of exactly
what to monitor to separate out impacts due to changes in dam
operation from those due to changes in ocean conditions,
harvest, and other variables is solved, incremental changes are
simply adjustments to an experiment that is already underway. 
The second problem with geographic scale is the need for
coordination across multiple jurisdictions to address problems
at a basin scale. Although matching the scale of governance
to the scale of the problem is frequently discussed (Ruhl and
Salzman 2010), scholars caution that complex systems often
require action at a variety of scales (Ruhl and Salzman 2010).
The observed need for flexibility to adapt to the scale of a
particular problem supports the call for polycentricity as a
component of adaptive governance. This and the pragmatic
recognition that legitimate democratic systems cannot merely
replace an existing multi-jurisdictional system with a single
basin-wide authority lead to the conclusion that coordination
at the scale of the basin should be addressed through a network
approach rather than elevating all decisions to a basin-wide
authority. Changes are nevertheless needed to implement any
network approach and must include coincidence of goals, time
scale, monitoring, and process on the issue in question across
network organizations. It is likely that this requires, at the very
least, authority incorporated at the highest jurisdictional level
to authorize treatment of ecosystem health at a level equivalent
to hydropower and flood control. In the case of the Columbia
River basin, this would be at the level of the international
treaty.
Time scale
Adaptive management requires monitoring the response to a
particular action for a sufficient period of time. This will
provide biologically meaningful data so that informed
decisions can be made on adjustments to management. The
political time scale is generally much shorter than the
biological one (Lee and Lawrence 1986, Volkman and
McConnaha 1993). In the Columbia basin, the political shift
that took place between program amendments to adopt
adaptive management for mainstem fish passage and
implementation of adaptive management on the mainstem
derailed the effort (Blumm 2002). In addition, the patience of
salmon advocates ran out and an attractive alternative was
available (i.e., listing under the ESA). For order-based
legitimacy, the time scale of incremental adjustment to
management decisions must reflect both biological and social
needs. Reconciling the ecological and social time scales in
making incremental changes to management must be achieved
through deliberative processes. Rate of change in components
of an ecological system should be factored into considerations
of what to monitor. At the same time, it must be acknowledged
that economic stability does not require absolute finality.
Incremental adjustments made on a time scale that takes the
investment cycle into account will not destabilize the system.
By elevating the dialog to the basin level, thus bringing fish
restoration and power generation into the same decision-
making process, a timeframe that meets both needs is more
likely to be found. Currently, instability under the ESA tracks
the federal election cycle. The gridlock and litigation expense
created by that process should cause some to consider a 10–
20-yr cycle of change to be a reasonable approach.
Attractive alternative
Frustrated with the slow pace of action under the Northwest
Power Act and the interpretation of the Bonneville Power
Administration that it need not comply precisely with the
recommendations of the Council, salmon advocates turned to
an attractive, more robust alternative, the Endangered Species
Act. The absolute prohibition on jeopardy in the ESA appeared
to be the necessary hammer to change mainstem federal dam
operation. Twelve populations of Columbia River salmon and
steelhead and two resident Columbia River species of fish have
been listed since the early 1990s. 
An analysis of the compatibility of the ESA and adaptive
management written by Council staff after the initial Snake
River listings was cautiously optimistic (Volkman and
McConnaha 1993). The authors noted that the focus of
adaptive management would probably change from hatcheries
to wild fish due to the listing, and that risky experimentation
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would be prevented by the ESA prohibition on jeopardy of
listed species by federal action. The authors also noted that
experimentation would nevertheless be feasible provided the
implementation of adaptive management did not lead to a
stalemate “over suitable hypotheses and experimental
measures” (Volkman and McConnaha 1993:1272).
Unfortunately, litigation and focus on disputes over uncertain
science prevailed over the optimistic scenario thought
possible. 
Many believe that the current ESA implementation in the
Columbia River basin is in a stalemate. The stalemate concerns
the science behind a determination of jeopardy or no jeopardy
rather than the science behind an evolving process of adaptive
management for purposes of restoration (Thomas-Morse
2012). The process of consultation under the ESA by the U.
S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries) took
on the appearance of politicized science when the Biological
Opinion on operation of the Federal Columbia River Power
System flipped from one of jeopardy under the Clinton
administration to one of no jeopardy under the Bush
administration (Thomas-Morse 2012). Whether a valid
accusation or not, its reception clearly signaled a loss of
legitimacy for ESA implementation in the Columbia River
basin. In addition, it has become clear that “no jeopardy” falls
short of management for ecosystem resilience (G. Hill and S.
Kolmes, personal communication). Finally, ESA implementation
has run into the same barrier that implementation by the
Council faced. Because it applies only on the U.S. side of the
border, agencies have attempted to keep implementation
within the parameters of the 1964 Treaty. Under U.S. domestic
law, a later-enacted domestic statute (e.g., the 1973 ESA)
prevails over a treaty, despite the fact that under international
law, this will place the United States in breach of the 1964
Treaty (Rogers 1999). Thus, U.S. entities seek to implement
domestic law in a manner that avoids conflict with a treaty,
limiting the range of possible measures. 
Thus, the attractive alternative of ESA listing relied on in the
1990s has not lived up to its promise. At the same time, the
threat of ESA sanctions has been a factor in balancing the
dialog in the basin and can remain an equalizing force. It is
the means to achieve its goals that require a new approach.
Lack of success under the ESA should encourage its
proponents to consider a new methodology. With no
permanent solution in sight after almost twenty years of
litigation, parties may be more receptive to an adaptive
approach that holds future actions accountable to measured
progress.
Public participation
The Council underwent an extensive sub-basin planning
process to inform its identification of priorities under the fish
and wildlife program (Volkman and McConnaha 1993). The
intent, under the leadership of Dr. Lee, was to integrate
economic and social concerns in restoration efforts (Volkman
and McConnaha 1993). This approach is an important aspect
of legitimacy, and the Council has been praised for these
efforts (Volkman and McConnaha 1993). At the same time,
the Council itself is composed of representatives of the four
basin states (leaving off the minor portions of Wyoming and
Nevada in the basin); however, there are also 15 Native
American reservations within the U.S. portion of the basin.
Under the sub-basin planning process, participation by tribes
would be as members of the public rather than as sovereigns.
Any new effort to implement adaptive management in the
basin can turn to the sub-basin planning process as a model of
public participation. However, achieving adaptive governance
must also include a recognized role for the 15 tribal sovereigns,
separate from the general public. By viewing governance in
the basin as polycentric, appropriate roles for tribal, state, and
international governance can be addressed separate from the
development of a robust process for public input.
CONCLUSION
The current review of the Columbia River Treaty provides an
opportunity to consider river governance at the scale of
international river management. If stakeholders seek a more
resilient form of river governance, it will require a change in
the operations and implementation of the Treaty to allow more
flexible response at the international level and greater local
input and coordination on efforts to restore ecosystem health.
The entities necessary to provide multiple, overlapping
authority now exist in the Columbia River basin, but it is their
input to the Treaty and operational decisions and their role in
implementation that require acceptance at the international
level. The groundwork for connecting local knowledge and
input to national-level decisions has been laid in the Columbia
River basin by substantial increases in local capacity since
ratification of the 1964 Treaty. 
Too often, scientific studies of ecological systems view the
legal and political system as boundary conditions. By focusing
research on those boundaries and how to move them, greater
implementation of emerging approaches to management for
resilience may be achieved. This will require changes to both
governance and the implementation of policy through
management. The current gap between the recognition by
resilience scientists that adaptive management is an
appropriate management tool in the face of uncertainty and
achieving its implementation may be bridged by recognition
of the difference between scientific accuracy and social
legitimacy and full integration of the social component.
Implementation of the flexibility required for adaptive
management must be accompanied by careful attention to the
use of scientific expertise and its separation from the tradeoffs
made by decision makers, consideration of both the biological
and social components in the choice of timeframes for
adjustment of management actions, and a robust, deliberative
public process supported by local capacity building to allow
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meaningful participation. Analysis of the changes necessary
to ensure legitimacy in governance provide another lens to
analyze the value of polycentricity, public participation, an
experimental approach to resource management, and
management at the bioregional scale as components of good
water governance.
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